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JURISDICTION AS COMPETITION PROMOTION:
A UNIFIED THEORY OF THE FCC’S
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
JOHN BLEVINS*
ABSTRACT
The FCC’s “ancillary jurisdiction” refers to the agency’s residual
authority to regulate matters over which it lacks explicit statutory authority under the Communications Act of 1934. Because many of today’s most controversial and consequential policy debates involve new
technologies not explicitly covered by that statute, the scope of the
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction has taken on a critical new importance in
recent years. In particular, the future of Federal Internet policy depends on resolving the questions surrounding ancillary jurisdiction.
In this Article, I provide a new theory of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction, arguing that it is best understood as an authority to promote
market competition. More specifically, ancillary jurisdiction has primarily addressed and promoted competition in markets where vertical leveraging is a concern—particularly those involving legacy network infrastructure. My argument has both a positive and normative
dimension. Descriptively, I argue that the competition-promotion
framework provides the most persuasive and coherent account of the
seemingly incoherent line of cases reviewing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction. Normatively, I argue that the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction
should be exercised in this manner, in large part to protect the doctrine’s viability in the face of increasing criticism and to shape it in a
way that both promotes competition and limits agency capture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1965, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had a
problem. Cable television, a relatively new service, was wreaking havoc on the FCC’s established regulatory order. The FCC, it seemed,
was powerless to stop it.
The problem traced back several decades to the Communications
Act of 1934 (Communications Act), which created the FCC but gave it
limited regulatory authority.1 Everyone agreed that the Communications Act authorized the FCC to regulate contemporary communications providers, such as telephone companies and radio broadcasting
stations. But cable service was a different animal—it was a regulatory platypus that defied the FCC’s traditional regulatory classifications. Because this strange new technology did not exist in 1934
when the Communications Act was enacted, the FCC lacked explicit
authority to regulate it. Further, Congress declined to enact new
legislation granting this authority to the FCC.2 In short, the FCC had
a problem.
It soon, however, found a solution—a novel and controversial solution whose repercussions continue to be felt more than forty years
later. With the courts’ eventual blessing, the FCC announced a new
1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-16, 48 Stat. 1064; see also 47 U.S.C. §
151 (2006).
2. See Amendment of Parts 21, 74 (Proposed Subpart J), and 91 to Adopt Rules
and Regulations Relating to the Distribution of Television Broadcast Signals by Community Antenna Television Systems, and Related Matters, 30 Fed. Reg. 6078 (proposed Apr.
29, 1965) (codified at 47 CFR pts. 21, 74) (notice of inquiry and notice of proposed rulemaking) (providing an overview of proposed legislation over various congressional sessions to
regulate cable service and reaching tentative conclusion that FCC had jurisdiction over
cable service).
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type of authority which came to be known as the FCC’s “ancillary jurisdiction.”3 Under this authority, the FCC could regulate services
that were merely related (or “ancillary”) to regulatory objectives explicitly referenced in the Communications Act.4 As applied to cable,
the Supreme Court eventually affirmed that the FCC could exercise
ancillary jurisdiction over cable service because the new regulations
were “reasonably ancillary” to the FCC’s existing television broadcasting regulations.5 Problem solved . . . sort of.
As it turned out, the FCC’s solution soon created new problems of
its own. These problems remain with us today and lie at the heart of
some of our most contentious and consequential policy debates. In
particular, the future of Federal Internet policy depends on resolving
the questions surrounding ancillary jurisdiction.
Analyzing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction has been an exercise in
confusion. Courts and scholars have criticized this authority as being
vague and incoherent.6 Others have criticized it as a virtually limitless authority.7 Despite these criticisms, it is clear that ancillary jurisdiction is a critically important foundation of modern communications policy. Indeed, several of the FCC’s most important decisions
have been based on this authority.8
Looking ahead, determining the proper scope of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction will grow even more important as the agency decides
whether and how to regulate emerging Internet-related services over
which it lacks explicit jurisdiction.9 In fact, these debates are already
raging at the FCC and in the courts. In October 2009, for instance,
the FCC proposed historic new regulations—based entirely on its ancillary jurisdiction—that would prohibit various forms of discrimination by broadband access providers.10 At the same time, the D.C. Circuit is currently hearing a challenge to the FCC’s 2008 order finding
3. See Amendment of Parts 21, 74, and 91 to Adopt Rules and Regulations Relating
to the Distribution of Television Broadcast Signals by Community Antenna Television Systems, and Related Matters, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, ¶ 19 (1966) (second report and order) (concluding that FCC had jurisdiction over cable service).
4. See id.
5. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 55-75 for examples of these proceedings.
9. With respect to many of these services, the jurisdiction is not clear because those
services have been formally deregulated under Title I of the Communications Act.
JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 220-21 (2005) (“The precise dimensions of the FCC’s ancillary authority will assume increasing importance as the Commission folds within the deregulatory scope of Title I the growing number of applications-layer
IP products that resemble [traditionally regulated] services . . . .”).
10. Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09191, FCC 09-93, ¶¶ 16, 83 (Oct. 22, 2009) (notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter 2009
Notice], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-09-93A1.pdf.
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that Comcast (a cable broadband access provider) violated federal
policy by blocking peer-to-peer applications.11 This order, which also
relied entirely on the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction, is currently being
challenged in court on jurisdictional grounds.12 If the order is reversed, it will likely jeopardize the FCC’s authority to enact any form
of broadband regulations, including its most recent proposed rules.
Given the importance of ancillary jurisdiction to modern policy,
the literature has been surprisingly silent about it, offering mostly
superficial summaries or limited analyses buried within larger pieces.13 These relatively limited analyses do not provide convincing descriptive accounts of when courts have upheld the FCC’s exercises of
its ancillary jurisdiction. For instance, some argue that there is no
logic at all to the courts’ decisions, while others contend that the cases turn on the existence of specific factors such as the presence of
new technology or the regulations’ relationship with preexisting legislation.14 While superficially appealing, none of these descriptions
withstand scrutiny.
In this Article, I provide a new unified theory of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction. Specifically, I argue that ancillary jurisdiction is
best understood as an authority to promote market competition. Admittedly, “competition” is a broad term that encompasses several diverse concepts.15 Accordingly, my analysis focuses primarily upon
promoting competition (and limiting anticompetitive conduct) within
markets where vertical leveraging concerns exist—particularly those
markets involving dominant infrastructure providers such as legacy
incumbent telephone companies.16
My argument has both a positive and normative dimension. Descriptively, I argue that the competition-promotion framework provides the most persuasive and coherent account of the seemingly incoherent line of cases reviewing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction. As I
show, the best predictor of whether courts will uphold the FCC’s ex11. In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (Aug. 20,
2008) (memorandum opinion and order) [hereinafter Comcast Order], available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 79-82. Specifically, Comcast has challenged the
order on both jurisdictional and procedural grounds, and the case is currently pending before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See Cable, CABLE COMM. DAILY, Sept. 10, 2008.
13. See infra note 109.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See, e.g., John Blevins, A Fragile Foundation—The Role of “Intermodal” and “Facilities-Based” Competition in Communications Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 241 (2009) (outlining various theories of competition underlying modern communications policy).
16. Vertical leveraging generally refers to using market power in an input market to
affect a downstream market. See Pietro Crocioni, Leveraging of Market Power in Emerging
Markets: A Review of Cases, Literature, and a Suggested Framework, 4 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 449, 452-55 (2008).
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ercises of ancillary jurisdiction is whether the regulation attempts to
facilitate market competition, largely in the sense of limiting potential vertical leveraging by dominant providers.
Normatively, I argue that the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction should
be exercised in this manner—that is, courts or Congress should limit
the FCC’s authority in this context to facilitating market competition
in this manner. Likewise, courts should reject the use of ancillary jurisdiction for other objectives, particularly social goals that are theoretically appealing, but are often nothing more than incumbent protections in disguise.
Limiting the scope of ancillary jurisdiction in this manner offers a
number of benefits that will help protect the doctrine’s viability in
the face of increasing criticisms. First, it adds both coherence and
concrete limits to a notoriously vague and potentially unlimited doctrine. Second, it allows courts and other policymakers to shape ancillary jurisdiction as a market-promoting tool that will help prevent
agency capture by providing a powerful ex ante constraint on the
FCC’s ability to benefit entrenched incumbents through its ancillary
jurisdiction authority. In essence, my proposal would maximize the
FCC’s power in regulatory contexts where it is least likely to be acting for the benefit of entrenched providers. Finally, the framework
that I propose confers legitimacy on the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine by aligning it closely with decades of precedent.
Part II provides an overview of ancillary jurisdiction, listing both
examples of—and problems with—the doctrine. Part III illustrates
why existing descriptive accounts of the cases that uphold or reject
the FCC’s ancillary regulations are unpersuasive. Part IV provides a
new descriptive account, arguing that ancillary jurisdiction is best
understood as a competition-promotion authority, in the sense described above. Part V provides a normative proposal and describes
the policy benefits of conceptualizing ancillary jurisdiction through a
competition-promotion framework.
II. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: AN OVERVIEW
This Part provides an introduction to the ancillary jurisdiction
doctrine, arguing that it arose in response to specific structural gaps
in the Communications Act. It next provides examples of how the
FCC has used (and proposes to use) ancillary jurisdiction, thereby illustrating the doctrine’s importance to modern communications policy. Finally, it outlines the problems and criticisms that surround the
doctrine; specifically, that it is a vague and limitless authority.
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A. The Problem: Structural Gaps in the
Communications Act of 1934
The story of ancillary jurisdiction begins with the birth of cable
television. In 1934, when President Roosevelt signed the Communications Act into law, no one had ever heard of cable television.17
Years later, however, someone got the idea of capturing over-the-air
television broadcast signals on antennae and transmitting them to
rural communities over cable wires.18 From these humble beginnings,
cable television was born. And it grew quickly, eventually drawing
the attention of television broadcast interests who saw it as a competitive threat.19
The growth of cable service almost immediately created regulatory headaches for the FCC.20 These headaches stemmed from the original structure of the Communications Act and, more specifically,
from the Act’s “silo-based” structure, which remains with us even today. A brief overview of the structure and history of the Act is critical
to understanding why ancillary jurisdiction ultimately emerged in
the late 1960s.
The structure of the Communications Act is a product of a technologically bygone era. It consists of a series of titles that divide the
world into providers rather than functions.21 The individual titles
17. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-16, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Cable television was first used in the late 1940s.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 627 (1994) (“The earliest cable systems
were built in the late 1940’s to bring clear broadcast television signals to remote or mountainous communities.”).
18. See Robert W. Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Does Video Delivered
over a Telephone Network Require a Cable Franchise?, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 259 (2007)
(“Cable television began in the late 1940s as shared noncommercial community antenna
television (“CATV”) services to improve signal reception in areas where it was poor.”).
19. See, e.g., Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 278, 312 (2004) (“[B]y the late 1950s, . . . broadcasters realized cable’s threat as a
successor industry.”).
20. For instance, in 1949, an FCC secretary wrote to Ed Parsons in Astoria, Oregon,
“asking him to explain his community-antenna television system.” Randy Alfred, Aug. 1,
1949: FCC Gets in on Cable TV, WIRED, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.wired.com/science/
discoveries/news/2008/08/dayintech_0801.
21. Scholars are almost uniformly critical of the silo structure. Rather than lumping
providers into a specified title or “bucket,” an alternative regulatory structure (one that
most scholars recommend) would be to regulate “horizontally” by network layer. See, e.g.,
Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 19-22 (2006). Regulations, they argue,
should focus on the network layer where a given activity takes place, not upon the label
given to the provider or the infrastructure. Id. For instance, a Title III wireless company
providing broadband access at the transport layer should not be subject to an entirely different set of regulations than a Title II wireline telephone company offering the same service at the same network layer. Although a comprehensive review of the “layers” proposals
is beyond the scope of this Article, see generally Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and
Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New
Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207 (2003); John T. Nakahata, Regulating Informa-
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correspond to—and regulate—a specific type of provider or network.
For instance, Title II covers only common carriers (telephones, telegraphs), while Title III covers only “radio” providers (radio, TV, wireless—all of which use radio spectrum). Congress eventually added
Title VI in 1984 to cover cable providers.22
Under this framework, the appropriate regulation depends not on
the function of the service, but on the label the FCC chooses to apply
to the provider or to the network infrastructure over which service is
provided. In fact, the FCC often regulates identical services differently if the providers or infrastructure have different “labels” (e.g., wireline telephone voice service falls within Title II, while wireless voice
service over radio spectrum falls within Title III).23 As the below diagram illustrates, this traditional approach creates vertical regulatory
“silos.”24

tion Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Communications Regulation from the Bottom
Up, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95 (2002); Douglas C. Sicker & Lisa Blumensaadt,
Misunderstanding the Layered Model(s), 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 299 (2006);
Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L. Mindel, Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2002); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
815 (2004); Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 1 (2002); Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law
for the Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 59 (2005); Kevin Werbach, A
Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 39-40 (2002);
and Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications
Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587
(2004). But see David P. Reed, Critiquing the Layered Regulatory Model, 4 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 281 (2006).
22. For an overview of these titles, see J. Scott Marcus, The Potential Relevance to the
United States of the European Union’s Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications 3-4 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 36, 2002), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-224213A2.pdf.
23. Whitt, supra note 21, at 596-97.
24. Richard Whitt also refers to these as “buckets.” Id. at 590-91 (“The Communications Act and implementing rules divide up the landscape based on traditional service,
technology, and industry labels . . . . These divisions assume clear, unwavering distinctions, with different categories defined by the assumed static characteristics of discrete
services or networks. The result is an inflexible approach of isolated ‘buckets’ or ‘silos’ governed by black-and-white, all-or-nothing thinking.”).
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FIGURE 1

The Communications Act, however, also includes other titles that
are not specifically linked to a type of communications service provider or network infrastructure. These are generally administrative
and penal provisions.25 The most important one for purposes here,
Title I,26 belongs in a class of its own. It is the introductory title that
lists the FCC’s purposes,27 outlines the agency’s general jurisdiction,28 establishes internal procedures,29 and includes a “necessary
and proper” clause.30 Critically, it is Title I that ultimately (and controversially) becomes the foundation of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction.
Congress structured the Communications Act in this manner for
specific historical reasons. Prior to the Act, both common carriers
and radio broadcasters were federally regulated, albeit by different
agencies. The Federal Radio Commission (FRC) regulated radio
broadcasting under the Radio Act of 1927,31 and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulated common carriers (railroads, telephones, telegraphs) under the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA).32 Con-

25. Title IV, for instance, includes various administrative and procedural provisions.
47 U.S.C. §§ 401-416 (2006). Title V includes penal provisions. 47 U.S.C. §§ 501-510; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 517-18 (2002) (providing overview of statutory titles).
26. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161.
27. Id. § 151.
28. Id. § 152.
29. Id. § 154.
30. Id. § 154(i).
31. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934) (creating
FRC). The 1927 Act expanded upon the Radio Act of 1912, which had originally established
federal jurisdiction over radio transmissions. See Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37
Stat. 302 (1912).
32. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) (amending ICA to encompass telephone and telegraph services).
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gress, however, eventually grew concerned that the ICC was too
preoccupied with railroads to give communications services proper
attention.33 When drafting the new legislation, Congress therefore
carved out these services from the ICC’s jurisdiction, which allowed
the agency to focus on railroads.34
The Communications Act of 1934 combined these two categories of
communications services (common carriers and broadcasters) under
one roof and created the FCC to govern them.35 The Act’s ultimate
structure reflected this merger. Title II became the common carrier
section, while Title III became the broadcasting section. In drafting
the new law, Congress essentially copied the older laws, usually verbatim, and inserted them into the new Act.36 For instance, Title II
came directly from the ICA, while Title III is more or less the Radio
Act of 1927.37
The problem with this structure is that it reflected the technological conditions of 1934. The FCC’s authority over common carrier
and radio providers was clear enough, but what happened if a new
type of communications provider appeared? Would the Communications Act apply?
When cable service appeared on the scene years later, these questions became more than academic. Indeed, the FCC struggled with
them for years.38 Because cable service was neither a common carrier
nor a broadcaster, it did not fit cleanly into any of the existing

33. Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and
Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at
3, 5 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
34. Id. at 4.
35. PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS 359-60 (2004) (discussing origins of “proposal to create a unified communications commission that would assume the FRC’s functions as well as the responsibilities of the Interstate Commerce Commission for regulating the telephone industry”).
36. Robinson, supra note 33, at 3; STARR, supra note 35, at 360 (“Although it formally
repealed the Radio Act of 1927, the new measure reenacted nearly all the provisions of the
earlier legislation, much of it verbatim.”).
37. See Robinson, supra note 33, at 3; see also Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes,
The Common Carrier Provisions—A Product of Evolutionary Development, in A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 25, 30 (Max D. Paglin ed.,
1989); STARR, supra note 35, at 360; J. Roger Wollenberg, The FCC as Arbiter of “The Public Interest, Convenience, and Necessity,” in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 61, 70-71 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); James B. Speta, A
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 263 (2002)
(“The common carrier provisions of the Act largely copied the ICA.”).
38. For one of the best overviews of the FCC’s initial regulatory struggles with cable,
see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority over
Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 NW. U. L. REV.
403, 433-37 (1982).
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titles.39 Thus, the FCC arguably had no jurisdiction over cable service
at all.40
The regulatory quandary that cable posed, however, was merely
symbolic of a larger problem, one made more pressing by the eventual growth of data processing and computer services in the 1960s
and 1970s (services that were similarly unknown in 1934). The problem was that technology changed quickly, while the FCC’s statutory
delegation did not. Plus, Congress has been notoriously reluctant and
slow to amend the Act throughout its history.41 Thus, to effectively
regulate American communications services, the FCC needed flexibility. Yet, at the same time, it needed to act within the bounds of its
statutory delegation of authority.
The Act’s unique statutory structure, however, made it difficult
for the FCC to strike this balance between flexibility and legality.
The FCC’s most obvious obstacle was that the silo-based titles did
not explicitly contemplate new services like cable and data
processing. Indeed, opponents of expanded FCC jurisdiction could
make a strong expressio unius argument against agency jurisdiction.42 Congress, the opponents could argue, not only specifically
listed the types of providers the FCC could regulate, but it imposed
exceedingly specific requirements upon them. This level of detail arguably excluded by implication any nonlisted services.
In sum, the FCC had to thread a delicate needle. It needed flexibility to address the challenges of new technology, but it also needed
39. For instance, cable service used wires like carriers did, but the transmissions
were only one way. At the same time, cable providers transmitted video programming like
broadcasters did, but generally not over radio spectrum. That said, some early cable companies, however, used microwave facilities for transmissions or parts of the transmission,
and, because they used spectrum, the FCC had extended regulations to them before extending to all cable service. See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to Adopt Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 38 F.C.C.
683, 683-84 (1965) (first report and order).
40. For instance, in 1958, the FCC concluded internally in Frontier Broadcasting Co.
v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958), that cable was beyond the reach of both Title II and Title
III jurisdiction. Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 434-35. Interestingly, just a
few years earlier in 1952, the FCC had internally concluded that it could regulate cable as
a common carrier under Title II. Id. at 433-34. Quite clearly, the rise of cable caused regulatory confusion.
41. The first, and only, comprehensive amendment was the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Other significant amendments in 1984 and 1992 primarily related to cable services. See Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106
Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
42. The full interpretative canon is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means
the “expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086-87 (2002).
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to remain within the confines of its authority. The FCC eventually
found a solution: ancillary jurisdiction.
B. The Solution: The Rise of Ancillary Jurisdiction
1. Overview of the Doctrine
Ancillary jurisdiction refers to the FCC’s power to regulate matters (e.g., services, providers) not explicitly listed in the Communications Act. For practical purposes, it is a “catch-all” residual jurisdiction that is used when the FCC lacks more explicit statutory authority.43 This Section briefly introduces the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine, with an eye toward how it navigates the FCC’s challenge of
maintaining flexibility while simultaneously remaining within its
statutory authority.
In 1968, the Supreme Court first endorsed the concept of ancillary
jurisdiction in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.44 In this seminal case, the Court concluded that the FCC has the authority to
issue regulations “reasonably ancillary to the effective performance
of the Commission’s various responsibilities.”45 (Thus the name
“ancillary jurisdiction.”) In plain language, the FCC’s regulations
must be related to something else—i.e., some other provision or regulatory scheme.
Southwestern Cable Co. remains good law, and its holding has
since solidified into a more formal two-pronged test.46 First, ancillary
jurisdiction exists if the regulation falls within the FCC’s general jurisdiction under 47 U.S.C. § 152.47 That is, the regulation must address an “interstate [or] foreign communication by wire or radio.”48

43. Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 41, 50-51 (2003) (“To regulate outside of its direct mandate, the FCC must rely on its
‘Title I’ or ‘ancillary jurisdiction’ authority. The justification for this form of FCC action
stems from a catch-all provision—contained in Title I of the Communications Act [at §
154(i)] . . . .”).
44. 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). Admittedly, the Supreme Court had held much earlier
that the FCC had “expansive powers” under the Communications Act. Nat’l Broad. Co. v.
United States (NBC), 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943). As explained infra in Part III.A, although
NBC provided important groundwork for Southwestern Cable Co., it did not establish ancillary jurisdiction in the modern sense of the doctrine. Crucially, the regulations at issue
in NBC were applicable to broadcasting stations, which clearly fell within Title III of the
Communications Act. Although the regulations were a backdoor attempt to regulate networks (which were also technically outside the scope of the Communications Act), the regulations were tailored—for jurisdictional purposes—to apply to only the stations actually
broadcasting signals. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 429-32.
45. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).
46. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
47. Id. at 700.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006).
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Second, the regulation must be “reasonably ancillary” to the performance of other FCC objectives and responsibilities.49
Together, the two prongs help the FCC strike a balance between
regulatory flexibility and legality. With respect to the former, the
two-pronged standard ensures flexibility by incorporating broad language. For instance, the first prong defines the FCC’s general jurisdiction expansively to cover any communication by “wire or radio.”
Similarly, the second prong gives the FCC wide latitude by incorporating a broad “reasonableness” standard. This flexibility is particularly important to the FCC in light of the uniquely rapid evolution of
communications technologies.50
At the same time, however, both prongs of the doctrine require the
FCC to remain within the statutory confines of the Communications
Act. To validly exercise ancillary jurisdiction, the regulated subject
must first fall within § 152’s general jurisdiction.51 Next, the FCC
must not only identify an explicit statutory foundation (a “hook”), it
must also show that its new regulation is sufficiently related to the
statutory hook.52
For this reason, it is inaccurate to characterize ancillary jurisdiction as an authority to reach beyond the Communications Act. Doctrinally speaking, ancillary regulations are part and parcel of the
FCC’s delegated statutory authority—just as congressional actions
deemed “necessary and proper” to enumerated constitutional powers
are also deemed valid.53
2. Examples: Ancillary Jurisdiction, Past and Present
Ancillary jurisdiction has played—and continues to play—a critical role in modern communications policy. Many of the FCC’s most
important—and most controversial—regulatory schemes have been
based upon its ancillary authority. Below, I provide a partial list of
important FCC regulatory actions that were both based upon the
agency’s ancillary jurisdiction and reviewed by courts. (A more com-

49. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 700.
50. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 846, 853 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The Communications
Act was designed to endow the Commission with sufficiently elastic powers such that it
could readily accommodate dynamic new developments in the field of communications.”).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Courts have repeatedly referred to § 154(i)—the textual foundation of ancillary jurisdiction—“as the ‘necessary and proper clause.’ ” See, e.g., Mobile Commc’ns Corp. of Am.
v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1996); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d
1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); N. Am. Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th
Cir. 1985).
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prehensive list that includes lesser-known cases is provided in the
footnotes.54) These proceedings include the following:
ŏ Computer Inquiry II. In the Computer Inquiry decisions
(Computer I, II, and III),55 the FCC grappled with the regulatory status of new “advanced” data-processing services—
which ultimately included computer services.56 The most
famous of these decisions—Computer II in 1976—has been
hailed as one of the FCC’s greatest regulatory successes,
creating the conditions for the Internet’s phenomenal
growth.57 In this proceeding, the FCC erected a regulatory
wall between “basic” transport services and newer “enhanced” computer services.58 Critically, although the FCC
allowed incumbent carriers to enter the enhanced services
market, it imposed various regulatory requirements to prevent those carriers from leveraging their subsidized legacy
infrastructure to gain an unfair competitive advantage.
These requirements included various structural separations

54. See cases cited infra notes 76-77. Note, however, that the examples I provide in
this section consist of cases reviewing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction. It is not a comprehensive list of every FCC order or adjudication that cites ancillary jurisdiction as authority. The focus on cases rather than regulatory orders will be addressed at length in a later
section. See infra Part IV.
55. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communications Services and Facilities (Computer I), 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (tentative decision of the commission); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules
and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry) (Computer II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final
decision); Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry) (Computer III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order). Collectively known as the Computer Inquiries, these are only the final orders—the proceedings themselves included notices of inquiries and of proposed rulemakings, which generated thousands of comments.
56. For a good overview of the decisions, see generally Robert Cannon, The Legacy
of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J.
167 (2003).
57. See, e.g., id. at 169 (arguing that Computer Inquiries “were a necessary precondition for the success of the Internet”); Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 130 (2003) (“Of the actions taken
in the Computer Inquiries, Computer II’s open access rules . . . were the most successful
and enduring.”); Whitt, supra note 21, at 599 (explaining that Computer Inquiries
“contributed strongly towards the commercial introduction, rise, and incredible success
of the Internet” (quoting Letter from Vinton G. Cerf, Senior Vice-President, WorldCom,
Inc., to the Honorable Donald Evans, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, and the Honorable
Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC (May 20, 2002))); Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 15, 17 n.5 (2006) (calling Computer Inquiries one of “U.S. telecommunications
law’s greatest successes”).
58. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d ¶¶ 2-9. The “basic/enhanced” division remains with us
today, although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 renamed them as “information” and
“telecommunications” services, respectively. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (46) (2006).
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and unbundling mandates.59 The courts ultimately upheld
these requirements as exercises of ancillary jurisdiction.60
Cable Regulation. Ancillary jurisdiction provided the sole
basis for cable regulation prior to 1984, when Congress finally added Title VI to the Communications Act, thus providing the FCC with explicit authority to regulate cable.61
The pre-Title VI regulations, however, were comprehensive
and often quite intrusive. They included access requirements, must-carry provisions, and even mandates that cable
companies originate their own programming content.62 As
explained more fully in Part IV, courts upheld some of these
regulations, but rejected others.
ŏ

Television Network Regulation. Following Southwestern
Cable, the FCC extended its regulatory regime to television
networks.63 While Title III clearly covered broadcast station
affiliates, the FCC had to rely on ancillary jurisdiction to
reach the networks themselves because they technically did
not broadcast anything.64 These regulations were often quite
intrusive, sharp limits on the ability of network corporations
to enter the syndication market and to obtain financial interests in video programming production.65
ŏ

Carterfone. In a famous series of proceedings that included
the 1968 Carterfone Order, the FCC established the right of
consumers to attach any nonharmful device to the telephone
network.66 Prior to these decisions, incumbent telephone
carriers had strictly limited the types of communication devices consumers could attach. The Carterfone regime has also been hailed as a success—credited for unleashing innovative devices such as modems, faxes, and answering ma-

ŏ

59. See Cannon, supra note 56, at 192-94.
60. Computer II was upheld by Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n v. FCC,
693 F.2d 198, 202-03, 212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The most significant Computer I regulations
were upheld by GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 732 (2d Cir. 1973). Part IV.B. will
address the aspects of Computer I that the court reversed.
61. Kyle D. Dixon & Philip J. Weiser, A Digital Age Communications Act Paradigm
for Federal-State Relations, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 321, 349-50 (2006).
62. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 696-700
(1979) (providing an overview of cable regulations predating Title VI).
63. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 489 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming
television network regulations).
64. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 428-29.
65. See Tamber Christian, The Financial Interest and Syndication Rules—Take Two,
3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 107, 107-09 (1995).
66. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service (Carterfone), 13
F.C.C.2d 420, 423-24 (1968) (decision).
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chines.67 When states tried to reregulate terminal
equipment following Carterfone, the FCC preempted state
regulation under its ancillary jurisdiction, and courts upheld
the action.68
ŏ Universal Service Fund. The Universal Service Fund
(USF) is essentially a tax that subsidizes telephone and
wireless service in rural areas, where such service might
otherwise be prohibitively expensive. (It shows up as a line
item on your monthly telephone bill.) Although Congress
formally authorized the USF under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996,69 the FCC first proposed the USF in 1983,
and courts upheld it as a valid exercise of the agency’s ancillary jurisdiction.70
ŏ Broadcast Flag. The so-called “broadcast flag” is a digital
code that prevents the unauthorized redistribution of digital
broadcasts.71 Fearing that the looming transition from analog to digital television would enable copyright infringement, the FCC in 2003 controversially required manufacturers of “devices capable of receiving digital television
broadcast signals”72 to recognize the flag, which would prevent retransmission.73 The FCC based these regulations
upon its ancillary jurisdiction authority,74 but the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument and vacated the regulations.75

Moving beyond this partial list to the ancillary jurisdiction cases
as a whole, courts have upheld the FCC’s ancillary authority in the
overwhelming majority of cases.76 Courts have, however, rejected the
67. C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 135, 176 (2008) (conceding that Carterfone helped unleash “applications such as modems and fax machines”); Weiser, supra note 43, at 68 (calling Carterfone “universally praised”); Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 389, 397 (2007)
(crediting Carterphone for “mass consumer versions of the fax machine, the answering machine, and, perhaps most importantly, the modem”).
68. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1050-52 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding
preemption of state regulation of terminal equipment despite “absence of explicit statutory
authorization”); see also Weiser, supra note 43, at 66 (“These rules, which govern the
equipment that can be used in connection with the telecommunications network, were ultimately upheld as a legitimate use of the FCC’s Title I authority.”).
69. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); see also 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006).
70. See, e.g., Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1310-12, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
71. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC., 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
72. Id.
73. Id.; Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23550 (2003) (report and
order and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (adopting broadcast flag requirements).
74. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 691.
75. Id. at 692, 705.
76. In addition to the cases already cited above, courts also upheld the FCC’s ancillary
regulations in the following cases. United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I),
406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972) (upholding various ancillary regulations of cable service); City of
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FCC’s assertions of ancillary jurisdiction in a handful of significant
cases, many of them involving pre-1984 cable regulations.77 Interestingly, some of these rejections have been quite recent. For instance,
in 2002 and 2005 respectively, the D.C. Circuit rejected and sharply
critiqued the FCC’s attempts to rely on ancillary jurisdiction to impose video description (i.e., “closed captioning”) and broadcast flag
requirements.78 The D.C. Circuit’s growing hostility to ancillary jurisdiction raises the question of whether the FCC’s authority will
survive or at least be significantly pared back in the near future.
These new questions about the scope of the FCC’s authority come
at a critical time. The FCC, policymakers, and scholars are currently
debating a series of proceedings that will potentially have enormous
influence on the future of advanced communications services (i.e., IPbased services). In several of these proceedings, if the FCC chooses to
act, it will have to rely on its ancillary jurisdiction to issue regulations.
One example of these proceedings is the recent controversy over
Comcast’s alleged blocking of BitTorrent traffic, a case which has
enormous policy implications in the larger network neutrality—or
“open networks”—debate.79 Briefly, the FCC—acting upon complaints
filed by parties such as the public interest organization Free
Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding ancillary regulations that
allowed nonlocal exchange carriers to be “open video system” operators); Mobile Commc’ns
Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404-07 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding ancillary authority
to require wireless license payment); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC
(NARUC II), 880 F.2d 422, 429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (confirming that FCC has ancillary authority to preempt state regulation of “inside wiring” for telephone service); New England
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding ancillary authority to require rate reimbursements); N. Am. Telecomms. Ass’n. v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282,
1293-94 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding ancillary requirement that newly formed regional Bell
operating companies submit capitalization plans as condition of re-entering equipment
market); Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding ancillary authority to require interim interconnection tariffs); N.C. Utils. Comm’n v.
FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1051 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding preemption of state regulation of terminal equipment despite “absence of explicit statutory authorization”); Nader v. FCC, 520
F.2d 182, 203-05 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding authority under § 154(i) to prescribe rates of
return); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding ancillary regulations prohibiting telephone carriers from providing cable service in local areas);
United Tel. Workers, v. FCC, 436 F.2d 920, 923-25 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (upholding ancillary
authority to approve tariff of experimental service by Western Union and Post Office).
77. See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1979) (reversing access requirements
for cable providers); Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 692, 705 (vacating broadcast flag regulations); Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FCC (MPAA), 309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (vacating video description requirements); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC (HBO), 567
F.2d 9, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (vacating programming restrictions on cablecasting); Nat’l
Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC I), 533 F.2d 601, 620-21 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (rejecting FCC’s preemption of nonvideo cable transmissions).
78. See Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 691-92, 705; MPAA, 309 F.3d at 798-99.
79. Comcast’s actions—also often referred to as “throttling”—consisted of interfering
with peer-to-peer file uploads by sending “reset” packets that gave a false error signal.
Brad Reed, Comcast Reshapes Traffic Management, NETWORK WORLD, June 9, 2008, at 17;
see also Comcast Order, supra note 11, at 2-6.
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Press80—ultimately held that Comcast violated Federal policy by
blocking applications such as BitTorrent that used peer-to-peer protocols. The FCC also ordered Comcast to verify that it had stopped
such actions.81 Comcast has since challenged the FCC’s authority to
issue the order, and litigation (FCC v. Comcast) is pending in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.82 One of the most contentious issues in
this case is whether the FCC can validly exercise ancillary jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband service.
The stakes of the Comcast litigation are high because of their implications on the FCC’s authority to regulate broadband access services more generally. Indeed, the FCC has recently proposed several
new regulations of broadband access that are intended to “preserve
the openness of the Internet” and to help “address emerging challenges to the open Internet.”83 These proposed regulations would codify the four “principles” of the FCC’s 2005 Broadband Policy Statement, which provided that Federal policy protect the rights of broadband users in various ways.84 The FCC also proposed two new principles that would require broadband access providers to offer service
in a “nondiscriminatory manner” and to disclose network management practices.85
These proposed regulations collectively encompass many of today’s most important and controversial broadband policy debates, including everything from network neutrality to “wireless Carterfone.”86 Further, the FCC’s only valid authority to enact these new
rules is its ancillary jurisdiction.87 In this respect, FCC v. Comcast
will determine whether the FCC has any authority whatsoever
over broadband access services.

80. Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that
Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement, WC
Docket No. 07-52 (Nov. 1, 2007); Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge
Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, File No.
EB-08-IH-1518 (Nov. 1, 2007) (cited in Comcast Order, supra note 11, at 5 n.33).
81. Press Release, FCC, Commission Orders Comcast to End Discriminatory Network
Management Practices 1 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter FCC Press Release].
82. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, appeal docketed, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
83. 2009 Notice, supra note 10, ¶ 5, 16 (codifying principles in Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986
(2005) (policy statement) [hereinafter 2005 Policy Statement]).
84. The 2005 Policy Statement included four “principles” and provided that users are
entitled to: (1) access the content of their choice; (2) access the services and applications of
their choice; (3) connect the legal devices of their choice to the network; and (4) enjoy competition among broadband access, content, and application providers. 2005 Policy Statement, supra note 83, at 14987-88.
85. 2009 Notice, supra note 10, ¶ 16.
86. “Wireless Carterfone” refers to Professor Tim Wu’s recent proposal that the FCC
adopt an open attachment rule for wireless devices. See Wu, supra note 67.
87. 2009 Notice, supra note 10, ¶ 83-87.
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In short, determining the scope of ancillary jurisdiction is increasingly important in light of the new, ever-changing IP-based services
that are competing with legacy services such as circuit-based telephone service or traditional cable video service.88 Because these new
services and developments are not explicitly addressed in the Communications Act, FCC action in these areas will necessarily depend
upon the scope of its ancillary jurisdiction authority. As the next section illustrates, however, ancillary jurisdiction has several lingering
problems that call this authority into question.
C. The Problems with the Solution: Criticisms
of Ancillary Jurisdiction
The benefits that ancillary jurisdiction provides are also the
source of the criticisms surrounding it. Recall that the doctrine arose
in response to a specific challenge—the need to expand the FCC’s
flexibility while remaining within its statutory authority. Virtually
no one feels that the doctrine has proven too constraining. The criticisms have instead focused primarily on the doctrine’s flexibility or—
more precisely—on its alleged excessive flexibility.
For instance, Professor Susan Crawford has argued that ancillary
jurisdiction has become a potentially unlimited authority. She writes
that the current doctrine “give[s] the FCC almost unlimited power
over anything concerning a wire or a radio signal.”89 Professor James
B. Speta has similarly referred to the doctrine as “untethered.”90
Even Justice Scalia has criticized this “undefined” authority and expressed doubt that the doctrine “constrains the agency in any meaningful way.”91
A second common critique is that the doctrine is simply vague and
“amorphous.”92 Professor Phillip Weiser has written that the doctrine
“is hardly a model of clarity or consistency.”93 On the question of the
types of circumstances in which the FCC may invoke its Title I ancillary jurisdiction, Professors Jonathan Nuechterlein and Philip Weiser posit that “[t]he answer to this question is as unclear as it is con-

88. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 220.
89. Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car, & the Internet, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 873, 925-26 (2006) (calling for Congress to limit the FCC’s ancillary authority).
90. James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting
It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 26 (2003). Thomas Merrill has called the Midwest Video I and
Southwestern Cable decisions, which recognized ancillary jurisdiction over cable, “spectacular breaches of principle.” Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2169-70 (2004).
91. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1014
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
93. Weiser, supra note 43, at 48-49.
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sequential.”94 They add that this uncertainty, coupled with the relatively limited number of cases, makes “confident predictions” impossible regarding when courts will uphold ancillary jurisdiction.95
A related aspect of the doctrine’s alleged vagueness is that its textual foundations are not altogether clear.96 This textual dispute extends to both (1) the authority to enact “ancillary” regulations in the
first place and (2) the types of statutory provisions that can serve as
“hooks” for those new regulations.
With respect to the former, the most widely accepted statutory
source for ancillary jurisdiction is § 154(i), which has been called the
FCC’s “ ‘necessary and proper clause.’ ”97 This statutory provision authorizes the FCC to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”98
Courts have widely embraced this interpretation, although not all
scholars have.99
With respect to the latter, parties have also disputed whether certain statutory “hooks” provide a sufficient foundation for the exercise
of ancillary jurisdiction. Under Southwestern Cable Co., the FCC
must identify a foundational statutory source upon which to base its
ancillary regulations.100 For instance, in that case, the Court upheld
cable regulations as ancillary to the FCC’s explicit statutory authority to regulate broadcasters.101
One of the most important controversies on this issue is whether
Title I itself can provide the independent “hook” for the ancillary regulations authorized by § 154(i).102 The controversy stems from the
94. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 217.
95. Id. at 219-20; see also Speta, supra note 90, at 22 (calling Title I ancillary authority “at best, uncertain”).
96. For example, in the recent Comcast throttling case, the parties disagreed about
the precise textual provisions that authorized the FCC to exercise ancillary jurisdiction in
the first place. Compare Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, In the Matter of Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 29-31 (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Memorandum] (arguing that Title I cannot provide an independent source of authority), with
Letter from Marvin Ammori, Free Press, Notice of Ex Parte Presentation, Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC’s Internet Policy
Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for “Reasonable Network Management,” WC
Docket No. 07-52, at 9-11 (June 12, 2008) (attaching legal memorandum) (arguing that
Title I does provide independent authority), available at http://www.freepress.net/files/
FP_et_al_Petition_Ex_Parte_Filing.pdf.
97. See, e.g., Mobile Commc’ns Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
98. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006).
99. For example, Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts have recently argued
that §154 should be understood merely as an authorization to enact internal housekeeping
procedures. Merrill & Watts, supra note 25, at 517-20. Courts, however, have never endorsed their argument.
100. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Comcast Memorandum, supra note 96, at 27-31.
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fact that Title I does not cover a specific type of network in the way
that Titles II and III do. Instead, Title I includes a laundry list of
general statements regarding the FCC’s jurisdiction,103 its purposes,104 and its internal procedures.105 Section 151 specifically explains
that the FCC’s purposes include “mak[ing] available . . . rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”106
Thus, the precise question is whether the FCC can enact regulations ancillary to the specific policy goals outlined in § 151, such as
promoting “reasonable charges” or “rapid” service. Because terms
like “reasonable” and “rapid” are potentially vague, “stand-alone”
Title I ancillary jurisdiction is potentially the most expansive authority, relying as it does on the broad purposes listed in § 151 rather
than on the more specific statutory requirements in the other titles.
Historically speaking, however, courts have generally found that
Title I is a sufficient and independent foundation of authority. Indeed, courts in several cases have upheld the FCC’s exercises of ancillary jurisdiction citing Title I alone.107
The broader point is that the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine remains controversial, and it includes a number of unsettled questions.
The confusion surrounding the doctrine is arguably jeopardizing the
future of ancillary jurisdiction altogether. The D.C. Circuit in particular has grown increasingly skeptical of the doctrine in recent years.108
For these reasons, the controversy surrounding ancillary jurisdiction threatens to deprive the FCC of a vital power to address the
challenges of new technologies and convergence. Given that this
threat arguably stems from the doctrine’s perceived incoherence, I
argue in Part III that this “vague” and “unlimited” authority has, to
the contrary, been relatively constrained and coherent. Before introducing this new descriptive account, however, it is important to more
fully address why the literature’s current descriptions of ancillary jurisdiction are ultimately unpersuasive and inconsistent with case law.

103. 47 U.S.C. § 152.
104. Id. § 151.
105. Id. § 154.
106. Id. § 151.
107. For a list of these cases, see Ex Parte Letter of John Blevins Regarding the Commission’s Ancillary Jurisdiction, Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 35 (Jul. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Blevins Ex Parte].
108. Jeffrey Silva, Appeals Court Questions FCC’s Authority on Backup Power Rule,
RCRWIRELESS (May 9, 2008), http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20080509/FREE/
354444178/-1/appeals-court-questions-fcc-s-authority-on-backup-power-rule.
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III. THE WEAKNESS OF CURRENT DESCRIPTIONS OF
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
In this Part, I argue that current positive accounts of the ancillary
jurisdiction doctrine are inadequate. As explained above, few scholars have attempted to provide a positive account of when courts will
uphold the FCC’s ancillary regulations.109 The few that have attempted to provide such an account contend that ancillary jurisdiction can be understood in terms of (1) addressing the challenges of
new technology; (2) the closeness of the regulations’ relationship to
the underlying “hook”; or (3) whether the regulations contradict other provisions of the Act. While these narrative frameworks explain
certain cases, they do not adequately describe the line of ancillary jurisdiction cases as a whole.
A. New Technology
One of the more potentially persuasive arguments is that courts
uphold ancillary jurisdiction when the FCC is addressing new dynamic technologies. Professors Nuechterlein and Weiser, for instance, write that courts are relatively more deferential to the FCC’s
assertion of Title I ancillary jurisdiction when it involves “dealing
sensibly with emerging and congressionally unanticipated technologies.”110 Courts too have repeatedly emphasized the challenges that
new technologies pose in upholding broad interpretations of ancillary
jurisdiction. For instance, in Midwest Video I (which upheld intrusive
regulations requiring cable companies to originate video programming),111 Chief Justice Burger reluctantly concurred, explaining that
“dynamic” technology created the need for a “flexible and virtually
open-ended” regulatory scheme.112
At first glance, linking ancillary jurisdiction with new dynamic
technologies seems quite reasonable. After all, the doctrine was
largely created in response to the unanticipated rise of cable television. Further, the Communications Act grants the FCC expansive
authority over a wide range of technological services that were
109. The most significant recent discussion of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction is contained in Weiser, supra note 43. The few other articles that discuss ancillary jurisdiction at
any length generally confine it to one section of a larger discussion. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 89, at 925-31; Speta, supra note 90, at 22-30. One notable exception is the 1982
article by Krattenmaker and Metzger, which provides a thorough analysis of the origins of
ancillary jurisdiction and its application to television networks. See Krattenmaker &
Metzger, supra note 38. This article, however, is now over twenty-five years old, and its
applicability is therefore limited because of recent developments.
110. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 219-20. The authors include a normative dimension in this point as well, and they add that the doctrine is uncertain. Id. at 219-23.
111. Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
112. Id. at 675-76. He also noted, though, that the FCC had reached the “outer limits”
of its authority. Id. at 676.
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changing rapidly even in 1934. Extending the doctrine to cover new
technologies therefore seems consistent with the purpose and spirit
of the Act.
The problem, however, is that the relative age of the technology at
issue does not adequately predict when a court will uphold the FCC’s
regulations. While courts have clearly upheld regulations in several
cases involving unforeseen technologies, they have also upheld several others that involved traditional technologies that were well
known even in 1934. In short, ancillary jurisdiction has been applied
to both old and new technologies. One example is the FCC’s direct
regulation of television networks. While Title III of the Act explicitly
covered broadcast stations, it did not cover the networks themselves.113 The reason is that the networks did not actually broadcast
anything; instead, they provided content for their affiliate stations to
broadcast. There is no reason, though, that Title III could not have
been drafted to cover networks as well. After all, networks would
have been familiar to contemporary policymakers—NBC was
founded in 1926114 and CBS was founded just one year later.115
Because of jurisdictional concerns, the FCC had, for decades, strenuously avoided regulating networks directly.116 Things changed,
however, when Southwestern Cable Co. opened a new door, allowing
the FCC to reach beyond the explicit text of Title III.117 Immediately
recognizing the logical implications of the Southwestern Cable Co.
decision, the FCC proceeded to regulate networks directly under its
new jurisdictional powers.118
Another example of “regulating the old” is the FCC’s ancillary
regulation of traditional wireline telephone networks. While several
telephone-related cases clearly involved new technologies (e.g., Computer II), several others did not. For instance, courts have recognized
the FCC’s ancillary authority to preempt state regulation of “inside
wiring” for telephone service,119 to require AT&T to refund proceeds
from excessive rates of return,120 and to create the Universal Service

113. Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 426.
114. Patrick M. Fahey, Comment, Advocacy Group Boycotting of Network Television
Advertisers and Its Effects on Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 696 (1991).
115. Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 285, 302 n.89 (2004).
116. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 429-33. The authors illustrate
how the FCC crafted its regulations to apply only to stations, even if the ultimate effect
was a backdoor regulation of the networks. It was precisely this type of regulations at issue
in NBC in 1943.
117. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
118. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 38, at 440-45.
119. See NARUC II, 880 F.2d 422, 429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
120. See Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1310, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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Fund.121 None of these regulations covered “new” technologies in the
sense that cable was “new.”
Another weakness of the technology narrative is that courts also
have rejected several ancillary regulations of new technologies. For
instance, although courts initially accepted the FCC’s regulation of
cable (an unforeseen technology), they grew increasingly skeptical of
the FCC’s actions and ultimately vacated several cable regulations in
the mid- to late 1970s.122 Similarly, the more recent broadcast flag
regulations quite clearly involved new dynamic technology.123 The
D.C. Circuit, however, also rejected these regulations.124
To be clear, new dynamic technologies have played an important
role in the evolution of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. In fact,
several cases can best be understood in those terms.125 My point,
however, is that the technology narrative does not provide the most
persuasive description of the cases taken as a whole.
B. Closeness of the Relationship
Another common descriptive narrative is that courts uphold ancillary regulations when they are sufficiently close to the underlying
jurisdictional hook. Under this view, the best predictor of a court’s
behavior is the closeness of the relationship between the ancillary
regulation and its statutory foundation. Professor Speta explains
that following Midwest Video II in 1979, where the Supreme Court
rejected various cable regulations, “[a]ll subsequent affirmances of
FCC Title I regulatory authority have depended upon showing a
close relationship between the regulation and the FCC’s authority
over common carriers or broadcasters.”126 Other scholars have offered
similar arguments.127
Similar to the technology narrative, however, the “closeness”
narrative also lacks descriptive, and thus predictive, power. To begin,
the standard is rather nebulous. What exactly makes a given
121. See New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1979); HBO, 567 F.2d 9, 17-18
(D.C. Cir. 1977); NARUC I, 533 F.2d 601, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1976); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
124. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
125. The early regulation of cable, for instance, was largely driven by the emergence of
new unforeseen technologies.
126. Speta, supra note 90, at 24-25. Professor Speta, along with Professor Glen Robinson, made a similar argument in the amicus brief they filed in FCC v. Comcast. Brief Amicus Curiae of Professors James B. Speta and Glen O. Robinson and the Progress and Freedom Foundation in Support of Petitioner Comcast Corporation and Urging that the FCC’s
Order be Vacated, at 11-15, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 2009).
127. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 43, at 63 (“[F]or a regulatory measure enacted under
Title I to withstand judicial review, it must relate closely to an express statutory policy.”).

608

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:585

regulatory scheme “close” to the underlying statutory authority? Are
there any objectively verifiable ways to assess it? The danger is
that this type of descriptive account can easily become circular, allowing observers to find “closeness” wherever courts happen to
uphold the authority.
The closeness narrative is also undermined by the case law. Indeed, several cases arguably contradict the notion that the closeness
of the relationship is the key factor in the courts’ decisions. For instance, it is difficult to reconcile the cable cases of the 1970s, Midwest
Cable I and II, under the closeness narrative. In 1972, in Midwest
Video I, the Court upheld extremely burdensome regulations forcing
cable companies to produce content.128 In 1979, in Midwest Video II,
by contrast, the Court rejected relatively less-onerous replacement
regulations requiring cable companies simply to make some channels
available for public access.129
More recently, the broadcast flag case, American Library Ass’n,
also undermines this narrative. Formally speaking, the court did not
even consider the relative closeness of the relationship because it
concluded that the broadcast flag regulations did not relate to a “radio communication” and thus fell outside the FCC’s general jurisdiction under the first prong of the analysis.130 The court’s conclusion,
though, seems strained given that the FCC has explicit jurisdiction
not merely over transmissions, but over devices that can receive and
forward broadcast transmissions. Section 153(33) makes clear that
the “radio communications” over which the FCC has authority includes “all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services
(among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission.”131
Assuming then that a perceived lack of “closeness” is what actually motivated the court’s conclusion, it is still difficult to find a coherent rationale for why the broadcast flag regulation was not sufficiently close to the FCC’s statutory objectives. For instance, the FCC
has an explicit statutory responsibility to facilitate the digital television transition.132 Without copyright protections, the FCC feared that
“content providers [would] be reluctant to provide quality digital pro-

128. Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972).
129. Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1979).
130. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Although the
analysis is not altogether clear, it appears that the court rejected the close-captioning requirements in MPAA under the same theory—namely, that “programming content” fell
outside the FCC’s general jurisdiction. MPAA, 309 F.3d 796, 802-06 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
131. 47 U.S.C. § 153(33) (emphasis added).
132. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN, HOWARD SHELANSKI &
PHILIP J. WEISER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 652-53 (2d ed. 2006) (“[T]he
[FCC] further asserted that the broadcast flag is integral to the success of the DTV transition.”).
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gramming.”133 Accordingly, it seems difficult to devise any objective
metrics by which these regulations were insufficiently “close” in comparison to other valid ancillary regulations.134
A variation of the closeness argument is that courts uphold ancillary jurisdiction when the underlying hook comes from somewhere
other than Title I. For instance, in the recent throttling proceeding,
Comcast made this very argument in its legal memorandum disputing FCC jurisdiction over broadband network practices.135 To be a valid exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, Comcast contended, the FCC
must provide a non-Title I statutory hook.136
Here too, though, the case law contradicts the narrative. As noted
above, courts have upheld numerous exercises of ancillary jurisdiction that were based on Title I alone, including the Computer II regulations.137 In sum, while the closeness narrative is reasonable in certain instances, it fails to provide a persuasive comprehensive account
of the courts’ actions.
C. Inconsistency with Other Provisions
A third descriptive narrative is that courts reject ancillary regulations when they are inconsistent with other provisions in the Act.
Under this view, ancillary jurisdiction can be used to fill unforeseen
gaps, but cannot contradict or supplement explicit statutory requirements. Under this view, ancillary jurisdiction might extend to
unanticipated technologies, but not to areas where Congress has already explicitly spoken. Professors Nuechterlein and Weiser, for instance, write that courts look disfavorably upon attempts to “supplement[] the established statutory schemes.”138
The case law, however, illustrates that courts have upheld ancillary regulations that essentially rewrite, and even blatantly contradict, existing statutory schemes. In some cases, the regulations simp-

133. Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 FCC Rcd 23,550, 23,565-66 (2003) (report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking).
134. The D.C. Circuit relied heavily on the claim that it was the FCC’s first use of ancillary jurisdiction over equipment manufacturers. See Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 695.
In addition to being inconsistent with the language of § 153(33) noted above, it also appears inconsistent with the FCC’s prior regulations of equipment. See Penina Michlin,
Note, The Broadcast Flag and the Scope of the FCC’s Ancillary Jurisdiction: Protecting the
Digital Future, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 919-20 (2005) (providing examples of equipment FCC has historically regulated).
135. See Comcast Memorandum, supra note 96, at 27-31.
136. See, e.g., id.
137. See Blevins Ex Parte, supra note 107, at 3-5.
138. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 219-20 (“[C]ourts have enforced [limits
on the jurisdiction] mostly when those rules are in tension with other legal principles codified elsewhere.”).
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ly supplement existing requirements.139 In several others, however,
the FCC’s regulations are hard to describe as anything other than
end-runs around the Act’s explicit requirements. In short, some ancillary regulations supplant more explicit statutory provisions rather
than merely supplementing them.
One good example of this dynamic is a line of cases involving rateof-return and interconnection regulations on telephone carriers. In
the first of these, Nader v. FCC, the court considered whether the
FCC had the authority to impose rate of return provisions.140 While §
205 of the Communications Act authorizes the FCC to prescribe “reasonable charge[s],”141 it does not mention “rates of return,” which limit the amount of fees that a regulated telephone carrier may charge
its customers. For instance, the FCC might set a maximum rate of
return of eight percent, which means that a carrier can recover from
customers the amount of the carrier’s costs plus an additional eight
percent return on those costs. While courts have acknowledged that §
205 of the Communications Act does not explicitly authorize the FCC
to establish rates of return, they nonetheless allowed the FCC to
enact them under its § 154 ancillary authority.142
While rate of return regulations are best understood as statutory
supplements, other FCC ancillary regulations in this area more
clearly contradict the Act. For instance, in Lincoln Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. FCC, the FCC had ordered the incumbent carrier (Lincoln) to file a tariff outlining the interconnection charges that would
apply to MCI, its new competitor.143 Section 203, however, explicitly
stated that “connecting carriers” like Lincoln did not have to file interconnection tariffs.144 Despite this fairly clear statutory exemption
from tariff requirements, the court nonetheless concluded that the
FCC had ancillary jurisdiction to impose the tariff requirement upon
Lincoln: “[W]hile Section 203(a) did not grant the Commission the
requisite authority for its action, Section 154(i) did.”145 Section 203,
however, did more than simply fail to grant power. It explicitly

139. Even in this situation, the ancillary regulations would theoretically be subject to
an expressio unius argument. See supra note 42.
140. Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 203-05 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
141. 47 U.S.C. § 205 (2006).
142. See, e.g., Nader, 520 F.2d at 203 (“Although section 205 does not authorize the
Commission to prescribe rates of return, we think that any literal interpretation would be
overly simplistic. . . . [O]ur inquiry is whether the . . . rate of return prescription is proper
under section 4(i).”).
143. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
144. Id. at 1108.
145. Id. at 1108-09.
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stated the opposite—§ 203 flatly exempted connecting carriers from
this requirement.146
Another example comes from New England Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. FCC.147 In this case, the FCC ordered carriers to
issue refunds to customers for excessive rate of return charges that
had been in place for years.148 Arguing that the FCC was acting illegally, the carriers asserted that § 204 was the only provision that
authorized refunds and that it applied only to “new” or “revised”
rates, not to longstanding ones (thus, they claimed applying ancillary
jurisdiction would contradict § 204).149 Conceding that § 204 did not
apply,150 the court nonetheless upheld the refund under the FCC’s
ancillary authority.151
D. Unlimited Power
Although it merits only a brief discussion, any argument that the
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction is best described as an unlimited power
is also inaccurate. Courts have rejected the FCC’s ancillary regulations on several occasions, particularly the older cable regulations.152
A related but potentially stronger argument is that there is simply no logic to the ancillary jurisdiction cases. Admittedly, the courts’
inconsistent approach to the FCC’s cable regulations can give the appearance that the doctrine is wholly inconsistent. The next Part,
however, refutes this characterization and provides a coherent descriptive account of the ancillary cases as a whole.
IV. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AS COMPETITION PROMOTION:
A NEW DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK
This Part provides a new comprehensive account of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction as interpreted by courts. Specifically, I argue that
ancillary jurisdiction is best understood as a competition-promotion
doctrine. The precise “competition” analyzed here is primarily in
146. Id. at 1108; see also 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1976). Another example of an inconsistency is Mobile Communications Corp. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1996), discussed infra
in Part IV. Briefly, the FCC in that case required a carrier to pay for a license it had previously allocated for free despite the tension with more explicit statutory licensing provisions. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
147. 826 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
148. Id. at 1103-04.
149. Id. at 1107-08 (“Petitioners nevertheless insist that a refund remedy is inconsistent with the Act, and therefore an inappropriate exercise of power under section 4(i), because it amounts to retroactive ratemaking.”).
150. Id. at 1107 (“As petitioners observe, section 204 is the only provision of the Act
explicitly to mention refunds, and it does not apply to the circumstances of this case.”).
151. Id. at 1107-08.
152. See, e.g., Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); HBO, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
NARUC I, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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markets where vertical leveraging concerns exist. As I illustrate below, courts generally defer to the FCC’s ancillary regulations when
the regulations are designed to facilitate market competition in this
context, particularly when the FCC acts to prevent owners of underlying physical facilities from leveraging that control to affect adjacent
markets that depend upon access to those facilities. Courts have given the FCC less deference, however, when the FCC acts to promote
other goals, such as social ones.
In this Part, I first examine cases where courts have upheld
the FCC’s ancillary regulations, arguing that the competition framework best explains the greatest number of them. I next examine cases where courts have rejected the FCC’s ancillary regulations, noting
that these regulations primarily served goals other than competition
promotion. Next, using cable as a case study, I illustrate how the
competition framework best explains the seemingly incoherent line
of cable regulation cases from the 1970s.153 Finally, I examine the
few cases that arguably do not fit within this descriptive framework.
While no framework can persuasively reconcile every single case,
I argue that the competition-promotion framework provides
significantly more descriptive power than any of the frameworks
listed in Part III.
A. Cases Upholding Ancillary Jurisdiction
This Section illustrates why the competition-promotion framework best explains most of the cases where courts have upheld ancillary regulations. Rather than tediously describing each individual
case, I have grouped them thematically into two categories—
specifically, cases where the FCC acted (1) to prevent providers from
leveraging perceived market power in one market to act anticompetitively in another and (2) to level the competitive playing field among
parties that did not have market power. In both categories, the
courts used market-promotion language and rationales in upholding
the FCC’s ancillary regulations.
1. Preventing Vertical Leveraging
In this first category of cases, the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction regulations were aimed primarily at providers with perceived market
power—namely, incumbent telephone carriers and national television networks. Turning first to the telephone cases, one of the FCC’s
animating concerns here involved the fear that telephone carriers
153. To preview the argument, I will contend that courts initially upheld the cases because of concerns about cable’s perceived “unfair” competitive advantage. Later, however,
when the regulations became more socially focused (and more flagrantly anti-cable), courts
became more skeptical.
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would leverage control of either their underlying physical facilities or
their monopoly status to act anticompetitively in adjacent markets.
The Computer Inquiry cases illustrate these concerns well.154 The
rise of data processing and computer services created at least two
regulatory problems for policymakers. First, these services depended
upon access to the incumbent carriers’ network facilities.155 If the
carriers limited that access or significantly raised access costs, it
could slow the growth of these new services. Second, carriers entering these new data markets themselves could potentially gain a competitive advantage by exploiting their monopoly to cross-subsidize
their service offerings.156 In other words, carriers could raise rates in
the regulated, noncompetitive voice markets to slash prices in the
more competitive data-processing markets.
The FCC’s Computer I and II decisions specifically responded to
these concerns. Computer I imposed a structural separation requirement, forcing carriers that offered data-processing services to create
a wholly separate subsidiary with separate equipment and accounting procedures.157 Computer II refined and clarified this requirement,
and it also divided communications services into “basic” common carrier services and “enhanced” unregulated ones.158 This division
helped ensure that emerging “enhanced” services would enjoy guaranteed access to “basic” transport services. As Robert Cannon has
explained, the promotion of markets and the protection from vertical
leveraging was the FCC’s animating concern throughout:
The first principles laid down in Computer I are consistently followed throughout the entire proceeding. How these first principles
are applied and the outcome that is produced may be different, but
the Computer Inquiries are consistently concerned about markets.
The data processing market is highly competitive and innovative
and demonstrates no need for regulation. The data processing
market, however, is dependent upon the communications market.
The communications companies are both a bottleneck supplier of
services and a competitor in the data processing market. Therefore, strict safeguards were put into place in order to restrain the

154. See supra note 55.
155. See, e.g., Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 428 (1980) (final decision) (noting “ever increasing dependence upon common carrier transmission facilities in the movement
of information”).
156. See, e.g., Computer I, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 299 (1970) (tentative decision of the commission) (“We recognize . . . that the provision of other services and, particularly data
processing services by common carriers, may give rise to critical problems of unfair competition and cross-subsidy.”).
157. See id. at 302-03.
158. Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 428-30.
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market power of the communications company and for the benefit
of the data processing market.159

Unsurprisingly, in upholding the FCC’s ancillary authority to
adopt the Computer I and II regulations, courts relied on these same
competition-promotion rationales. For instance, in upholding Computer II, the D.C. Circuit in Computer and Communications Industry
Ass’n v. FCC explained as follows: “This [regulation] was based upon
detailed findings on AT & T’s market power and its ability to underwrite its competitive offerings with profits from its monopoly
services. We believe this conclusion is well founded.”160 Years earlier,
the Second Circuit in GTE Service Corp. v. FCC had offered similar
market-based explanations in upholding Computer I’s original structural separation.161
More generally, courts have upheld numerous ancillary regulations aimed at preventing anticompetitive conduct by incumbent telephone carriers who own legacy infrastructure that was subsidized
during monopoly eras. In this context, courts have upheld FCC ancillary regulations that (1) preempted state regulations of terminal
equipment;162 (2) established interim interconnection rates for MCI (a
competitive carrier);163 (3) restricted the ability of phone carriers to
provide cable service in local areas;164 (4) required incumbent carriers
to refund excessive fees to customers;165 and (5) preempted state regulation of inside wiring for telephone networks.166 Further, in dicta,
courts also have recognized the FCC’s authority to impose requirements on private Title I “dark fiber” offerings.167
The common thread running through all of these cases is the fear
that incumbent carriers could take advantage of either their facilities

159. Cannon, supra note 56, at 180.
160. Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(citation omitted).
161. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 732 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Specifically, the Commission was concerned that data processing costs would be passed on directly or indirectly
to the public consumer of telephone services and that revenues derived from common carrier services would be used to subsidize data processing services.”). The Second Circuit,
however, also struck down part of Computer I. In the next Section, I attempt to reconcile
the GTE court’s actions under the competition framework.
162. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1051 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding
preemption of state regulation of terminal equipment despite “absence of explicit
statutory authorization”).
163. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
164. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1971).
165. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
166. NARUC II, 880 F.2d 422, 429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
167. E.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he
Commission has ancillary jurisdiction over private offerings of common carriers under section 152 . . . .”). Dark fiber refers to high-speed transmission lines that have not yet been
activated or “lit,” but that could be. See id. at 1478.
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or their ability to cross-subsidize services to inhibit market competition. Indeed, courts explicitly note these concerns in their opinions.
For instance, in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest, the court
upheld the FCC’s authority to prevent phone carriers from providing
cable service in their local areas.168 In doing so, the court noted the
FCC’s concern that carriers might leverage their control of underlying facilities to undermine cable competition.169 Specifically, the court
explained that the FCC was protecting cable competitors that “rely
on the telephone companies for either construction and lease of
channel facilities or for the use of poles for the construction of their
own facilities.”170
The D.C. Circuit offered similar arguments in Lincoln Telephone
& Telegraph Co., which upheld interconnection tariff rates, primarily
for the new upstart MCI.171 The court’s language makes it clear that
competition concerns motivated the extension of ancillary jurisdiction here, even though the ancillary regulation itself was likely inconsistent with a separate statutory provision:
LT&T and MCI are . . . bitter rivals who are at loggerheads. It is in
LT&T’s interest to limit the competition posed by MCI, or any other specialized carrier. While we in no way mean to intimate that
LT&T is attempting to set unreasonable terms and conditions, we
do observe that LT&T’s incentive to do so is great. The Commission properly perceived the need for close supervision and took the
necessary course of action . . . .172

Moving beyond telephone carriers, anticompetitive concerns also
explain the FCC’s regulations of television networks. While other
scholars have offered more comprehensive historical accounts of
broadcasting, it is sufficient for purposes here to understand the difference between networks and stations. Generally speaking, individual local stations (the ones that actually broadcast) affiliate with a
national network, which in turn provides the station with programming content. The networks themselves, though, generally do not
broadcast signals over the air.173
From the very beginning, the FCC was concerned that networks
had market power and would leverage that control to influence adjacent markets such as programming content. However, because the
FCC could not regulate the networks directly under Title III, the
168. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 449 F.2d at 850.
169. See id. at 851.
170. Id.
171. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
172. Id. at 1109. On the statutory inconsistency, see supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
173. For an overview of these traditional business relationships, see Krattenmaker &
Metzger, supra note 38, at 408-11.
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FCC instead tailored its regulations to apply only to the stations. In
essence, these were backdoor regulations of networks that were
structured to limit the types of agreements that stations could enter.174
After Southwestern Cable Co. changed the regulatory landscape
by introducing ancillary jurisdiction, the FCC immediately applied it
to the networks directly. The resulting regulations included the socalled “fin-syn” rules, which sharply limited the networks’ ability to
take financial interests in programming companies and to enter the
syndication market.175 In upholding the FCC’s regulations, the
Second Circuit echoed the concerns that networks might otherwise
act anticompetitively in these markets.176
2. Leveling the Competitive Playing Field
In this smaller category of cases, the FCC’s ancillary regulations
were designed to promote competitive neutrality. Unlike in the previous category, the parties here (wireless companies and early cable
providers) were not perceived to have market power.
Turning first to wireless services, the ancillary regulation upheld
in Mobile Communications Corp. of America v. FCC177 is best understood as an attempt to level the competitive playing field. There, the
FCC had originally assigned a wireless (PCS) license to a carrier
(Mtel) for free.178 However, as wireless service grew in the 1990s, the
FCC became concerned that the free PCS license would give Mtel an
unfair competitive advantage.179 It thus reversed its previous decision
and required Mtel to pay for the license.180 Interestingly, the reversal
also seemed to violate a specific statutory provision governing wireless license fees.181
The D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld the regulation.182 In doing so,
the court echoed the same competitive concerns that had motivated
the FCC to rescind the free license. Specifically, the court outlined in

174. See id. at 429-33.
175. See Christian, supra note 65, at 107-09.
176. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC442 F.2d 470, 486-87 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[T]he
syndication rule is aimed at decreasing network dominance and curbing potential competitive restraints.”).
177. 77 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir 1996).
178. Id. at 1402.
179. Application of Nationwide Wireless Network Corp., 9 F.C.C.R. 3635, 3639 (1994)
(memorandum opinion and order) (“[W]e are concerned that the award of a free license to
[the carrier] would create an unfair competitive advantage . . . .”).
180. Id. at 3640.
181. The carrier had noted that the Communications Act had specific provisions governing administrative fees and thus raised an expressio unius argument. Mobile
Commc’ns Corp. of Am., 77 F.3d at 1404-05.
182. Id. at 1406.
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detail the various reasons why rival providers would be unfairly
harmed by Mtel’s free PCS license.183
In sum, the competition-promotion framework reconciles far more
of the cases above than the descriptive frameworks listed in Part III.
For instance, courts upheld cases involving both new technologies
(Computer I) and old ones (television network regulations). In addition, some of these regulations were flatly inconsistent with other
statutory provisions. Competition promotion, by contrast, is the
common thread running through all of these cases.
B. Cases Rejecting Ancillary Jurisdiction
The competition-promotion framework also provides the best explanation for the cases where courts rejected the FCC’s exercises of
ancillary jurisdiction. Often, the rejected regulations were designed
to promote social goals (as opposed to market competition). Other “rejected” cases, however, are more difficult to classify under one conceptual umbrella, though they are generally consistent with a competition-promotion descriptive framework.
1. Noneconomic Goals
Courts have been most likely to reject ancillary regulations when
the underlying regulatory goal is primarily social in nature. Of
course, there is no bright conceptual line separating economic goals
from social goals. Social goals often have economic dimensions, and
vice versa. That said, the less that the FCC’s regulatory objectives
are aimed at promoting competition (and preventing vertical leveraging in particular), the more skeptical courts become.
Two recent D.C. Circuit decisions vacating the FCC’s ancillary
regulations—MPAA (2002) and American Library Ass’n (2005)—
illustrate the courts’ skepticism of noneconomic goals.184 In MPAA,
the FCC required television broadcasters to provide “video descriptions” for the hearing impaired.185 As laudable as this goal might
have been, it quite clearly had little to do with market competition.
Similarly, the broadcast flag regulations at issue in American Library
Ass’n were primarily about preventing copyright infringement.186

183. Id. at 1405-06 (noting competitive disadvantage of “would-be license holders”).
184. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (vacating broadcast
flag regulations); MPAA, 309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating “video description” requirements).
185. MPAA, 309 F.3d at 798.
186. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 693-94. While protecting copyright has both economic and social dimensions, its protection is arguably less motivated by systematic efforts
to facilitate markets by, for instance, preventing vertical leveraging.
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The courts in these cases, however, did not speak in terms of social versus economic goals, but instead offered other reasons for rejecting the FCC’s regulations. For instance, in MPAA, the court
stressed that the FCC was trying to illegally reach “content,” which
triggered First Amendment concerns.187 In addition, the FCC’s
regulations appeared to contradict the statutory scheme regarding
video descriptions.188 In American Library Ass’n, the court emphasized that the FCC was extending regulations to device manufacturers for the first time.189 It also held that the broadcast flag regulations did not cover “transmission[s]” and thus fell outside the FCC’s
general jurisdiction.190
There are reasons to be skeptical, however, that these factors
were motivating the court’s decisions. As explained earlier, the
court’s conclusions in the broadcast flag case are arguably inconsistent with both the Act and precedent.191 And though the video description rules arguably contradicted other provisions of the Act, we
have seen that courts often endorse ancillary regulations anyway.
Further, some of the concerns the courts cited could apply just as
easily to other cases where the courts upheld ancillary jurisdiction.
For instance, the FCC’s limitations on television networks’ association with programming potentially implicated both content and First
Amendment concerns. Despite these potential similarities, the more
competition-oriented regulations were upheld, while the more socially oriented regulations in the two more recent cases were not.
2. Miscellaneous Cases
Courts have also rejected ancillary regulations in a handful of
other cases, one of which (involving the construction of the Sears
Tower) quite clearly had no procompetition objective.192 In two others,
though, the cases appear at first glance to be in tension with the descriptive framework I have outlined.
In the first, California v. FCC, the Ninth Circuit vacated several
of the FCC’s Computer III regulations,193 which had relaxed Comput187. MPAA, 309 F.3d at 805 (“One of the reasons why § 1 has not been construed to allow the FCC to regulate programming content is because such regulations invariably raise
First Amendment issues.”).
188. See id. at 802 (finding that 47 U.S.C. § 713 barred FCC’s regulations).
189. Am. Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 695.
190. Id. at 704-05.
191. See supra note 134.
192. Ill. Citizens. Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 1397, 1398-99 (7th Cir. 1972)
(holding that FCC lacked jurisdiction to regulate construction of the Sears Tower to prevent signal interference). The FCC had denied that it had the authority to act, and it was
sued on that basis. Id.
193. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing Computer III
in part).
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er II’s structural separation requirements. Upon close review, however, California arguably has little relevance to the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. For one, the court rejected the regulations for other
reasons—namely, because they were deemed arbitrary and capricious and an intrusion on state jurisdiction.
To the extent that the case is relevant to an ancillary jurisdiction
analysis, it arguably supports the competition-promotion framework.
The regulations in California relaxed the competitive safeguards that
Computer II had erected. Indeed, the court here seemed concerned
that the regulations would harm competition in these markets by
prematurely removing the structural separations.194
The second case, GTE Service Corp. v. FCC,195 is more problematic. As explained above, GTE upheld the original Computer I structural separation between carriers and their data-processing subsidiaries. On this level, GTE is clearly consistent with the competition
framework. However, GTE went on to vacate other Computer I regulations that imposed requirements directly upon the data-processing
subsidiaries themselves (including limitations on contracting with
the affiliated carrier).196 The court concluded that the FCC was improperly reaching into a competitive market that it had previously
declined to regulate.197
This decision, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with the
framework given that the data-processing market alone (isolated
from the carrier facilities) was competitive and not threatened by anticompetitive conduct. That said, the court quite clearly was not deferring to the FCC’s economic judgment (in this respect, this part of
the case does not fit well within the framework).
C. Cable Regulation: A Case Study
One challenge in developing a descriptive framework is reconciling the line of cases reviewing the FCC’s ancillary regulations of cable in the 1960s and 1970s (ancillary regulations became unnecessary after Congress added Title VI in 1984). These cases are, to put it
mildly, not a model of coherence. The competition-promotion framework, however, provides the most coherence possible, both in terms
of explaining the cases themselves and in illustrating their relationship to the other ancillary jurisdiction cases. In particular, the

194. Id. at 1228-29 (“[T]he FCC provided no record support that any of the so-called
changes were relevant to its regulatory task of protecting captive ratepayers and competitors against the damaging effects of cross-subsidization.”).
195. 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
196. Id. at 733.
197. See id. at 733-34.
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framework best accounts for the cases’ evolution, which was toward
competition promotion.
At first glance, the cable cases seem incoherent, particularly at
the Supreme Court level. Consider, for instance, Midwest Video I
(1972) versus Midwest Video II (1979)—two Supreme Court cases
that arguably contradict each other. In Midwest I, the Court upheld
extremely intrusive regulations requiring cable companies to create
their own programming content. These regulations, however, were
soon replaced with relatively less-intrusive “access” regulations,
which required cable companies to set aside channels for third parties (e.g., public, government). In Midwest II, however, the Court vacated these less-intrusive regulations.198
While the cases seem to contradict each other, some coherence
emerges when we look not merely at Supreme Court cases but at the
larger context of cable cases as a whole during this period. Below is
the timeline of the most important cable ancillary cases and how the
courts ruled.
TABLE 1
YEAR
1968
1972
1975
1977
1979

CASE
Southwestern Cable
Midwest Video I
NARUC
HBO
Midwest Video II

COURT
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
DC Circuit
DC Circuit
Supreme Court

RESULT
Upheld
Upheld (plurality)
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected

From this perspective, a trend emerges—courts grew less deferential
to the FCC’s cable regulations through time. And though courts offered various reasons for their skepticism, I will argue that this trend
can be best explained within the competition-promotion framework.
Of course, the more familiar story of early cable regulation is that
the FCC used its initial ancillary authority to protect an incumbent
industry from competition.199 Under this view, the FCC’s regulations
represent agency capture at its worst. While subsequent cable regulations clearly support that view, the original motivations were arguably more ambiguous. More precisely, it is plausible to see how

198. Compare Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972), with Midwest Video II, 440
U.S. 689, 695-96 (1979). Dissenting in Midwest Video II, Justice Stevens noted the logical
inconsistency of upholding less-intrusive regulations than the Court rejected in Midwest
Video I. See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 709-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1688 (2003) (“The desire to protect incumbents also determined
the FCC’s response to the emergence of cable television.”).
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courts might have perceived the FCC’s initial regulations as more
benign efforts to promote competitive neutrality.
In the initial case, Southwestern Cable, courts arguably saw the
FCC as acting to limit what it perceived to be cable’s unfair competitive advantages with respect to broadcasters. From a contemporary
perspective, the original behavior at issue in Southwestern Cable Co.
was problematic in a couple of ways. First, cable service relied upon
appropriating broadcasters’ transmission signals (for which they paid
nothing).200 Second, cable companies were also importing broadcast
programming (often identical programming) from distant markets
that otherwise could not be seen in the local community.201 The FCC’s
ultimate regulations responded to these specific concerns.
Clearly, the FCC’s actions both helped broadcasters and served
social goals such as protecting free over-the-air television. However,
the regulations also had a sincerely procompetition dimension. Specifically, the FCC aimed to eliminate cable’s perceived unfair competitive advantage stemming from its reliance on broadcast retransmissions. The HBO court, in distinguishing Southwestern Cable to vacate cable regulations, explained this thinking:
What was considered unfair by the Commission in the distant signal cases was that cable was competing with local broadcasters by
bringing into the local area identical programming plucked out of
the air from distant stations. Because local broadcasters had to
pay copyright royalties for this material and cable did not, cable
was thought to have an unfair advantage.202

Over time, though, the courts grew increasingly skeptical of, and
eventually rejected, subsequent regulations that either had noneconomic objectives or represented more blatant anticompetitive efforts
to protect incumbent broadcasters. Nominally, the objectives were
more socially oriented (e.g., promoting programming diversity, protecting the quality of free programming). For instance, the channel
“access” requirements struck down in Midwest Video II were nominally adopted to promote programming diversity and self-

200. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-62 (1968) (noting that cable
providers “do not recompense producers or broadcasters for use of the programming which
they receive and redistribute”).
201. Id. at 163 (“[Cable providers] may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant
stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae. As the number and size of [cable] systems have increased, their principal function has more frequently become the importation
of distant signals.”).
202. HBO, 567 F.2d 9, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The HBO court, however, disagreed with
the FCC’s argument that Southwestern Cable prevented unfair competition. Id. at 41.
However, the court noted that, even if Southwestern Cable should read that way, the competitive concerns in that case were different than in the case before it. Id at 41-42.
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expression.203 Similarly, in HBO, the FCC limited the types of programs that cable companies could charge the public to see. The concern was that the most popular programs would be “siphon[ed]” away
from free broadcast television, thus lowering its quality (particularly
for lower-income viewers).204 Finally, in NARUC, the court struck
down regulations that had quite literally no relation to video or
broadcasting competition—the regulations dealt with two-way nonvideo communications.205
While these regulations were nominally social, the more cynical
interpretation is that they intentionally suppressed competition by
burdening cable. Indeed, if you scratch beneath the surface of the
courts’ opinions, they seemed increasingly to view these “social” regulations as blatant efforts to stifle cable competition to protect incumbent broadcasters. For instance, the court in HBO noted cable’s concerns that the FCC was trying to “snuff out pay cable” programming.206 The court added the following:
[I]t is clear that [the regulations’] thrust is to prevent any competition by pay cable entrepreneurs for film or sports material that either has been shown on conventional television or is likely to be
shown there. How such an effect furthers any legitimate goal of
the Communications Act is not clear.207

Other courts raised similar concerns. In Midwest Video II, the
Eighth Circuit all but accused the FCC of being “captured” by incumbent broadcasters.208
The one cable case, however, that does not fit within this narrative is Midwest Video I, where the Court upheld regulations requir-

203. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the
Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 76.251,
59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 (1976) (report and order) (explaining that channel access regulations
will “result in the opening of new outlets for local expression, aid in the promotion of
diversity in television programming, . . . aid in the functioning of democratic institutions,
and improve the informational and educational communications resources of cable television communities”).
204. HBO, 567 F.2d at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, one of the
judges called for limiting the FCC’s authority in this area strictly to promoting competitive
neutrality. See id. at 28 n.* (“Judge MacKinnon is of the view that the FCC’s jurisdiction to
regulate cablecasting in the interests of the broadcasting industry is restricted to instances
where the cable stations substantially rely on broadcast signals or their activities amount
to unfair competition.”).
205. NARUC I, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
206. See HBO, 567 F.2d at 25.
207. Id. at 28 (citation omitted).
208. Midwest Video II, 571 F.2d 1025, 1030 n.8 (8th Cir. 1978) (“Whether agencies become captives of their regulates, . . . the wisdom and implications to social progress of a
regulatory system that enlists the power of government to preserve established industry
against new technological competition, as distinguished from reliance on consumer preference at a perceived risk of market chaos, is a matter for the Congress, not the courts.”).
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ing cable companies to create their own programming content.209 The
regulatory objections here were not only social, but most likely anticompetitive as well.
There are several reasons, however, why Midwest Video I undermines the descriptive framework less than it might appear. First,
Midwest Video I marked the beginning of federal courts’ skepticism.
The Court in Midwest Video I upheld the regulations in a plurality
opinion that depended on a reluctant concurrence from Chief Justice
Burger who warned that the FCC had “strain[ed] the outer limits” of
its ancillary authority.210 Second, the logic of Midwest Video II arguably overruled the earlier case. Third, Midwest Video I was a relatively early ancillary jurisdiction case in which the Court was still
working out the doctrine’s contours. As the table above shows,
though, courts steadily grew skeptical of the types of regulations at
issue in Midwest Video I. Thus, even if Midwest Video I itself provides little support, the broader evolution of the case law does.
In sum, the competition framework illustrates why the cable cases
are not necessarily an incoherent mess after all. Of course, the narrative is not perfect, and courts did offer wide-ranging and often inconsistent rationales in upholding and rejecting cases. But when we look
closely at both of the cases as a whole and the types of regulations at
issue, a clearer picture emerges.
D. Objections
Having laid out the descriptive framework, I turn now to potential
objections. The first is simply that the narrative does not reconcile
every single ancillary jurisdiction case. In this respect, it suffers from
the same weaknesses as the ones I critiqued in Part III.
Admittedly, the framework cannot adequately account for every
case—it is probably unrealistic to think that any narrative could.
However, the framework reconciles significantly more cases than any
other account could or has. In doing so, it illustrates why the doctrine
has far more coherence and limitations than previously believed.
Further, the cases that appear to contradict the narrative, like Midwest Video I and California v. FCC, actually have limited relevance
or even reinforce it.
That said, there are admittedly a small number of cases that
simply do not fit. For instance, the FCC’s creation of the Universal
Service Fund (USF) is arguably unrelated to competition promotion.
Similarly, the initial case upholding the FCC’s ancillary authority to

209. See Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972).
210. Id. at 675-76 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result).

624

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:585

establish rates of return, Nader v. FCC,211 seemed to benefit AT&T
rather than its competitors. In that case, the FCC lowered AT&T’s
proposed rate of return, but not low enough to suit the company’s
competitors, who then petitioned courts to vacate it (unsuccessfully).212
Even these cases, however, arguably reinforce the narrative—or,
at the least, do not contradict it. The creation of the USF, for example, was one piece of a larger scheme to liberalize and restructure the
long-distance market.213 So while the USF regulations themselves do
not necessarily promote competition, they were part of, and enabled,
the larger regulatory reform. Similarly, in Nader, the authority at issue (the FCC’s authority to set rates of return) was intimately tied to
AT&T’s monopoly status. Notably, the FCC did in fact lower AT&T’s
proposed rate of return.214 While reasonable minds can disagree on
the wisdom of rate-of-return regulations, these regulations were motivated in some sense to prevent incumbent carriers from charging
excessive rates. But again, even assuming these cases ultimately
contradict the descriptive narrative that I have proposed, that narrative nonetheless reconciles significantly more cases than the other
narratives have or can.
A second concern is that focusing on cases, as opposed to FCC orders, is a misguided approach. After all, the cases represent only a
fraction of the instances in which the FCC has exercised its ancillary
jurisdiction. Essentially, I am only reviewing instances in which the
ancillary jurisdiction was challenged through litigation. In addition,
one may argue that the cases themselves are too small a subset from
which to make meaningful inductions.
Focusing on cases does, however, have several important advantages. For one, cases more accurately reflect when the FCC is actually relying on its ancillary jurisdiction, as opposed to merely citing it
within a laundry list of potential sources of authority. If anything, relying on challenged cases strengthens the analysis because it presumably involves the FCC’s weakest claims of ancillary authority.
Otherwise, parties might not have invested the resources to litigate
these regulations. The fact that courts have overwhelmingly affirmed
the FCC regulations within this particular subset of challenged cases
when they promote competition is itself telling.
In addition, cases provide a more manageable and easily verifiable
subset for analysis. While there are not an overwhelming number of
211. 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
212. See id. at 186-87.
213. Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“This case concerns
part of the Commission’s attempt to use its power to allocate costs between federal and
state jurisdictions in order to cushion the transition to a competitive long-distance communications market.”).
214. Nader, 520 F.2d at 186-87.
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cases, there are enough from which to draw informed conclusions.
Further, the ancillary jurisdiction authority is ultimately as broad as
courts say it is. To know its scope, we must necessarily examine how
courts have treated it. The competition-promotion framework
represents a significant improvement on the existing descriptive
understanding of a doctrine often criticized as vague or even unlimited. The next Part, by contrast, examines what courts should do
going forward.215
V. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AS COMPETITION PROMOTION: A
NORMATIVE PROPOSAL
The fact that courts have traditionally upheld exercises of ancillary jurisdiction in the circumstances described above does not, in
and of itself, normatively justify adopting the framework. Indeed,
given that courts’ conclusions are not dictated by the text of § 154(i),
they are arguably best understood as policy preferences. These policy
preferences, however, are sound and should be more formally incorporated into courts’ doctrinal analysis (or, even better, in future legislation or regulation).
Accordingly, this Part argues that courts and other policymakers
should adopt the competition-promotion framework in reviewing and
crafting the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction authority. Consistent with
past practice, courts should uphold exercises of ancillary authority
that promote competition and prevent anticompetitive behavior, primarily where vertical leveraging concerns exist.216 Similarly, courts
should reject attempts to use ancillary jurisdiction for other noneconomic objectives.
This Part first offers several justifications for adopting this normative approach. Broadly speaking, the most important normative
benefits of the competition-promotion framework are that it would
impose a coherent limit on the FCC’s authority, while simultaneously
providing a powerful ex ante restraint on agency capture. Expanding

215. One could disagree with the normative proposals that follow in Part V while
agreeing with the positive analysis in Part IV.
216. There is a spirited debate about whether regulatory policy should, as a normative
matter, be concerned with vertical leveraging at all. Compare, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo,
Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171
(2002) (refuting economic concerns about vertical leveraging in media markets), with Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 109-12 (2003) (outlining regulatory contexts where vertical leveraging concerns
are valid). This Article is only marginally relevant to that more general debate. My more
limited point is that when the FCC has affirmatively decided to act to address vertical leveraging notwithstanding these objections, it should have the authority to do so under the
ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. If the FCC, by contrast, feels that vertical leveraging poses
no concern, it can simply refrain from regulating.
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on the latter point, the framework would provide the FCC with maximum authority in situations where it is institutionally most likely to
be acting against the interests of entrenched providers. Finally, after
outlining these various normative benefits, this Part illustrates how
the approach would work in practice by applying it to various individual regulatory proceedings.
A. Normative Benefits of the Competition-Promotion Framework
1. Coherence
The first benefit of adopting the competition-promotion framework
is that it would bring coherence and concrete limitations to the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. These objectives, however, are not merely
ends in themselves. Achieving them will also protect the viability of
the ancillary jurisdiction authority in the future.
Both courts and scholars have grown increasingly critical of the
doctrine in recent years.217 These criticisms stem directly from the
doctrine’s perceived inadequacies—namely, its alleged incoherence
and potentially limitless scope. This Article has attempted to correct
these perceptions. However, if left uncorrected, the perceptions could
threaten the viability of the doctrine itself. The D.C. Circuit, for instance, has grown particularly skeptical of the doctrine and arguably
wants to abandon it. As illustrated in earlier sections, the court recently has engaged in doctrinal gymnastics to avoid recognizing the
FCC’s ancillary authority while nominally acknowledging Southwestern Cable.
While these criticisms raise important concerns, it is nonetheless
important that the FCC retain some form of ancillary jurisdiction authority. As courts have noted for years, the communications field is
an inherently dynamic one that is characterized by rapidly changing
technologies. The FCC therefore needs the flexibility to accommodate
these changes to ensure that they do not undermine the agency’s
regulatory goals.
Further, the structure of the communications industry makes it
particularly fertile ground for potential anticompetitive conduct.
Many vital services, particularly broadband and the vast array of
services that rely on it, continue to depend upon access to underlying
physical facilities owned by legacy monopoly providers. These providers are subject to little or no access competition.218 It is therefore
critical that the FCC retain the authority to address these concerns.

217. See supra Part II.C.
218. For instance, the broadband access market is frequently alleged to be—at best—a
duopoly of cable and DSL (wireline telephone) providers. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford,
Network Rules, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 61-65 (2007).
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It does not follow, however, that the FCC should have unlimited
authority. A better approach would be simply to define the doctrine’s
scope more narrowly, which adopting the proposed competition
framework would do. In particular, adopting this framework would
address critics’ specific concerns without throwing the baby out with
the bathwater.
2. Institutional Expertise/Preventing Agency Capture
Another significant benefit of adopting the competition-promotion
framework is that facilitating this type of market competition within
these industries falls more squarely within the FCC’s expertise and
core competence. The FCC, unique among policymakers, has a global
understanding of not only the various telecommunications industries, but the new dynamic interrelationships that convergence has
created (e.g., cable companies providing “phone” service and vice versa). The FCC is therefore institutionally well suited to understand
how technological or regulatory changes in one industry will affect
other interrelated industries. In particular, the agency can assess potential externalities imposed by the regulation or deregulation of a
particular communications industry (e.g., does deregulation of broadband access limit video competition from new online providers?).
In addition, the FCC has extensive experience addressing concerns about access to network facilities. Indeed, the problem of incumbent providers leveraging their facilities has preoccupied the
agency from its inception up through more modern problems, such as
the implementation of the 1996 Act.
When the FCC, however, has strayed from these objectives, it has
acted in areas where it has less institutional expertise. For instance,
in the recent broadcast flag case, the FCC’s primary objective was to
prevent copyright infringement. However, a separate federal agency,
the United State Copyright Office, has far more expertise in this area
than the FCC.219
Another problem with promoting noneconomic regulatory objectives is that these goals are inherently more contentious. The regulatory goal of promoting competition, by contrast, is less controversial.
While parties sharply disagree about how to best promote competition and whether it is a realistic option in certain contexts, there exists a fairly wide consensus that facilitating market competition is a
normatively appealing regulatory objective, other things being

219. See BENJAMIN, LICHTMAN, SHELANSKI & WEISER, supra note 132, at 653.
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equal.220 More socially oriented objectives such as programming diversity and localism, by contrast, are generally more controversial.
Note, however, that I am not casting doubt on the FCC’s ability to
pursue regulatory social goals as a general matter. My more limited
argument is that it should not do so under its ancillary authority,
which could lead to perception of illegitimacy of the FCC’s ancillary
regulations. Expanding the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction to enact controversial social goals has arguably triggered a strong backlash that
could ultimately weaken the entire doctrine. Instead, it would be
wiser for the FCC to wait for a more explicit statutory delegation
from Congress, the more politically accountable branch of government.
An additional concern with promoting social objectives is that
they have, historically, proven more susceptible to agency capture
and special interest regulation. Indeed, this is arguably what happened to the FCC in the 1970s as it passed increasingly anticompetitive cable regulations. Under the guise of promoting vague concepts
such as “programming diversity,” the FCC effectively hindered the
growth of cable services for years. In a similar vein, the broadcast
flag regulation was seemingly intended to benefit politically wellconnected incumbent industries.
Agency capture, of course, is not necessarily confined to social
goals. Conceivably, the FCC could help incumbent providers just as
easily under the guise of promoting “competitive neutrality.” Historically, however, this fear has been largely unfounded. Most of the cases upholding ancillary jurisdiction have either helped new competitors or limited the ability of incumbent providers to leverage their
legacy facilities. The most likely reason is that the regulatory context
of addressing vertical leveraging is, institutionally speaking, more
likely to involve regulations adverse to the larger, more established
provider who would benefit from the ability to leverage.
Essentially, I am proposing an interpretive rule of construction
that construes the FCC’s powers under § 154(i) more broadly when
the agency acts to promote competition in the face of vertical leveraging concerns. One benefit of this interpretative canon is that it would
reduce the potential for agency capture by erring on the side of new
competitors. Established providers are often much more politically
well connected than new rivals. And as noted above, they (particularly legacy facilities owners) are much more likely to benefit from vertical leveraging. For that reason, they have the incentive and the
ability to resist proentry policies. Constraining the FCC’s ancillary
220. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation
of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325-26 (1998) (illustrating a broad
shift in regulatory law over the last quarter of the twentieth century toward promoting
market competition).
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authority in this manner would maximize the agency’s authority
within regulatory contexts where it is least likely to be helping established incumbents. This type of doctrine would help prevent a repeat
of the more egregious cable regulations in the 1970s that were transparent attempts to stifle cable competition on behalf of broadcasters.
3. Legitimacy
Another benefit of the competition-promotion framework is its
consistency with precedent. Assuming that courts’ decisions are essentially policy preferences, the decades of precedent would help both
legitimize the doctrine and avoid charges that courts are acting like
self-appointed regulators. Instead, in the tradition of common law jurisprudence, they would be adopting a rule with a long and solid
foundation in precedent. The consistency of the competitionpromotion framework with the case law would therefore increase the
concept’s legitimacy and strengthen its doctrinal foundations.
4. Political Compromise
Finally, for those who think political preferences matter more
than doctrinal logic, the competition-promotion framework
represents an appealing political compromise.221 On the one hand,
the framework appeals to skeptics of agency regulation by narrowing
the agency’s regulatory powers and ensuring that it operates more
clearly within its statutory delegation. On the other hand, it appeals
to regulation advocates by ensuring that the agency can act to prevent anticompetitive conduct by entrenched incumbents (particularly
facilities owners) in emerging markets.
B. Regulatory Examples
This Section illustrates how the competition framework would
look in practice by applying it to several modern regulatory proceedings. In some of the proceedings, the framework suggests that courts
should uphold ancillary regulations. In others, it suggests the opposite.
1. Comcast Throttling Proceeding
The FCC’s recent reprimand of Comcast is a textbook example of a
proceeding where courts should uphold the FCC’s authority under
the competition-promotion framework.222 As noted earlier, Comcast
was discovered to be interfering with applications such as BitTorrent
221. Interestingly, the hostility to ancillary jurisdiction does not necessarily track
clean ideological lines. For instance, both Comcast and Susan Crawford, who have rather
divergent views on broadband access policy, are both skeptical of broad ancillary jurisdiction.
222. See FCC Press Release, supra note 81.
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that use peer-to-peer protocols.223 Critically, the FCC found that
Comcast had an “anticompetitive motive” to interfere with these applications, which represent an emerging competitive threat to traditional cable video services: “Such applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, provide Internet users with the opportunity to
view high-quality video that they might otherwise watch (and pay
for) on cable television. Such video distribution poses a potential
competitive threat to Comcast’s video-on-demand . . . service.”224
Looking ahead, the D.C. Circuit should uphold the FCC’s order
as a valid exercise of its ancillary authority to promote competition
and prevent vertical leveraging. Notably, Comcast owns the underlying facilities over which higher-layer applications such as BitTorrent
run. Thus, the FCC’s order directly addresses the concern that Comcast will leverage control of its facilities to affect vertical markets
(which is precisely what it did). More broadly, affirming the FCC’s
broad authority to promote these types of objectives will create
incentives for broadband access providers to refrain from future
technologically novel techniques that achieve the same anticompetitive purposes. In this respect, adopting the competition-promotion
framework will provide economically beneficial signals to broadband
access providers.
It is not strictly necessary that the FCC establish or even suspect
an anticompetitive intent in the traditional antitrust sense. Instead,
courts should uphold the regulations even assuming that Comcast
acted solely for the more innocent purpose of managing congestion.
Regardless of Comcast’s subjective motivation, its actions would
nonetheless potentially impede video competition and other higherlayer markets.225
2. Open Network Regulations
The open network regulations recently proposed by the FCC
would also be easily justified under the competition-promotion
framework. While the proposed regulations encompass multiple policy debates,226 the animating fear among regulatory advocates
throughout all of these contexts is that facilities-based broadband
223. See supra note 79.
224. FCC Press Release, supra note 81.
225. My point is not to prevent broadband access providers from taking steps to avoid
congestion (assuming they are consistent with open access and nondiscriminatory principles). The larger point is that courts should not block, on jurisdictional grounds, the
FCC’s attempts to act in this context, assuming the underlying regulations are designed to
promote competition. The FCC should of course balance these various considerations in
crafting an ultimate policy.
226. The regulations, for instance, would impose network neutrality, open device attachment, and other nondiscrimination and disclosure requirements. I refer to these policy
debates collectively as “open network” policies.
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providers will stifle competition in vertical markets that depend on
incumbent facilities.227 For instance, the primary fear of network
neutrality advocates is that infrastructure owners will leverage their
control of these underlying facilities in economically harmful ways.
These potential harms include establishing a prioritized “fast lane”
for those services that can afford to pay a premium to the broadband
access providers—premiums that would stifle new competitors by
raising entry costs. A related fear is these providers could give their
own affiliated services priority over competitive online services.
These same considerations would apply to the imposition of open
network requirements as merger conditions. For instance, in the recent AT&T and BellSouth mega-merger, the FCC negotiated “voluntary” conditions that included temporary network neutrality requirements.228 Critics of these conditions argued that the FCC lacked
the authority to impose such requirements (thus the need for “voluntary” conditions).
Even assuming, however, the FCC had explicitly imposed network
neutrality requirements (either here or in similar proceedings), those
requirements should have been upheld under the competitionpromotion framework. Here again, the FCC would have been addressing potential anticompetitive behavior made possible by the
carriers’ control of legacy infrastructure.
Indeed, the specific language of the requirement illustrates these
concerns. Under the merger condition, the new AT&T/BellSouth
cannot “privilege[], degrade[] or prioritize[] any packet transmitted
over AT&T/BellSouth’s wireline broadband Internet access service
based on its source, ownership or destination.”229 The most notable
aspect of this language is not what it prevents, but what it continues
to allow. It would have been easier if the FCC simply prevented
treating any packet differently for any reason. Instead, the FCC prohibited specific types of differential treatment associated with limiting competition in vertical markets. So long as they are crafted in
this spirit, ancillary regulations imposing neutrality requirements
should be upheld.
In short, open network requirements—whether one agrees or disagrees with them—are primarily intended to promote and protect
competition in adjacent markets. Accordingly, they are the types of
ancillary regulations that fall squarely within the FCC’s institutional
expertise and that warrant broader deference by courts under the
competition-promotion framework.
227. See generally Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004).
228. AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp., Application for Transfer of Control, 22 FCC Rcd
5662 (2007) (memorandum opinion and order).
229. Id. at 5814.
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3. Public Safety
Courts, however, should reject the FCC’s ancillary regulations
when the objective is to promote public safety. Few can deny that
promoting public safety is a vitally important role of government.
The problem, however, is less the merits of the objective itself
and more that the FCC’s methods of promoting it have proven historically problematic.
Public safety as a regulatory objective has proven to be susceptible
to agency capture and interest group regulation. Professor Susan
Crawford has written at length of the FCC’s problematic drafting of
recent public safety rules applied to VoIP voice service—specifically,
E911 and Communications Assistance Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) requirements.230 While the new rules nominally involved
promoting public safety, Crawford illustrates how in reality they
were influenced—if not written entirely—by third-party private companies that would benefit financially from them.
The goal in limiting ancillary jurisdiction in this context, then, is
not to impede public safety regulations, but to force an institutional
shift in the way the rules are drafted. Specifically, many of these
concerns would be reduced if these responsibilities were shifted to
Congress in the first instance. Airing these various issues out in
Congress would ensure more public scrutiny and would at least reduce the chances that private parties could exploit public safety concerns for financial gain. Professor Susan Crawford writes as follows:
Out of the glare of public scrutiny that would likely accompany
any attempt to legislate in the CALEA and E911 context, incumbents, law enforcement, and vendors of compliance services are
finding it relatively easy to exact Commission rules that favor
these parties and keep the world of telephony policy in place.
These parties would find it relatively difficult to obtain these same
rules from Congress, because more interest groups would be involved and more eyes would be watching.231

Interestingly, adopting the competition-promotion framework
would address these precise concerns. While the agency proceedings
would still be relatively obscure to the public, the framework I pro-

230. See Crawford, supra note 89, at 893-925. The FCC enacted these rules on both
statutory grounds and on its Title I ancillary authority. Courts upheld both sets of regulations by relying on direct statutory authority and not ancillary authority. Vonage Holdings
Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Finding that the Commission has section 254(d) authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to make USF contributions,
we have no need to decide whether the Commission could have also done so under its Title
I ancillary jurisdiction.”); Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 232-35 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (relying on CALEA statute to affirm FCC authority).
231. Crawford, supra note 89, at 925.
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pose would operate as an ex ante constraint that prevents the FCC
from doing the bidding of the politically well-connected.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to correct popular misunderstandings of ancillary jurisdiction as a vague and potentially unlimited doctrine. It is particularly important to address these criticisms given that they threaten to weaken the doctrine entirely. The
competition-promotion framework accomplishes these goals and thus
helps protect a doctrine that has proven vital in some of the country’s
most important communications regulatory proceedings. The
framework illustrates the coherence and limitations of the doctrine
as courts have interpreted it. Further, it also provides a sound,
workable, and politically acceptable roadmap for policymakers in
the future as they grapple with the problems and potential of the
intersection between new unforeseen technologies and traditional
legacy infrastructure.
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